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Abstract
The traditional approach to face anti-spoofing sees it
as a binary classification problem, and binary classi-
fiers are trained and validated on specialized anti-spoofing
databases. One of the drawbacks of this approach is that,
due to the variability of face spoofing attacks, environmen-
tal factors, and the typically small sample size, such classi-
fiers do not generalize well to previously unseen databases.
Anomaly detection, which approaches face anti-spoofing
as a one-class classification problem, is emerging as an
increasingly popular alternative approach. Nevertheless,
in all existing work on anomaly detection for face anti-
spoofing, the proposed training protocols utilize images
from specialized anti-spoofing databases only, even though
only common images of real faces are needed. Here, we
explore the use of in-the-wild images, and images from non-
specialized face databases, to train one-class classifiers
for face anti-spoofing. Employing a well-established tech-
nique, we train a convolutional autoencoder on real faces
and compare the reconstruction error of the input against
a threshold to classify a face image accordingly as either
client or imposter. Our results show that the inclusion in
the training set of in-the-wild images increases the discrim-
inating power of the classifier significantly on an unseen
database, as evidenced by a large increase in the value of
the Area Under the Curve. In a limitation of our approach,
we note that the problem of finding a suitable operating
point on the unseen database remains a challenge, as ev-
idenced by the values of the Half Total Error Rate.
1. Introduction
Face liveness tests authenticate users of face recognition
systems by processing input images and deciding whether
they come from a human face or, for example, from printed
photos held in front of the system’s camera by an im-
poster. The main challenge for developing a robust face
anti-spoofing is the number of types of presentation attacks
the system must learn to recognize. For example, an im-
poster could be presented to the face recognition system a
printed photo, a screen displaying a still image, or a screen
replaying a video. A multitude of other factors, such as the
quality of the printed photo, the resolution and type of the
displaying screen, the illumination conditions of the scene,
and the characteristics of the system’s camera, may also
have a significant effect on the performance of any anti-
spoofing algorithm. Finally, a robust anti-spoofing algo-
rithm should be able to cope with previously unseen attack
methods, which were not anticipated prior to its deploy-
ment.
In this context, anomaly detection using classifiers
trained on client images only are becoming an increasingly
popular approach to face anti-spoofing [2][1]. The present
work is motivated by the observation that training with
client images only can also use in-the-wild face images, that
is, face images found online, as well as face images from
databases that do not specialize in face-anti-spoofing.
To assess the merits of that approach, we first devel-
oped an anomaly detection anti-spoofing algorithm based
on a Convolutional Autoencoder (ACE). Following a well-
established methodology, the ACE is trained on client im-
ages and test images are classified as clients when their re-
construction error is below a threshold. First, we trained
the ACE with client images from the Replay-Attack [6]
database, and tested it on the Replay-Attack and NUAA
[13] databases, creating a baseline. Next, we added into
the training dataset in-the-wild images, which were semi-
automatically collected from online sources. The results
show that the classifier’s discriminative power, as measured
by the Area Under the Curve metric, increases markedly on
the unseen NUAA, with a moderate only drop on Replay-
Attack. Finally, we added to the training set images from
databases that do not specialize in anti-spoofing, SCFace
[8] and CASIA-Web face [21] in particular, obtaining again
similar results.
The main contributions of the paper are:
• An anomaly detection method for face anti-spoofing
based on a convolutional autoencoder, which only re-
quires RGB images for input.
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• We tested the proposed autoencoder on the previously
unseen NUAA database, showing that it increases sig-
nificantly when we add into the training set in-the-wild
face images and face images from non-specialized
databases.
The main limitation of the proposed approach is revealed
by the second set of tests, which compute the Equal Error
Rate (EER) on the validation test and use the correspond-
ing operating point, that is, the threshold against which the
reconstruction error is compared, to compute the Half Total
Error Rate (HTER) on the NUAA dataset. The high HTER
values show that even after the enrichment of the training
and validation sets, it is still not straightforward to com-
pute a threshold giving satisfactory error rates on unseen
databases.
2. Background
In the past few years, a large number of methods have
been proposed for the face presentation attack problem
(PAD). Such methods can be classified into intrusive and
non-intrusive types [12], depending on their interference
with the bio-metric data acquisition process. The non-
intrusive methods, as the one proposed here, have received
more attention in the literature. Another categorization of
spoofing detection methods examines the way the classifica-
tion algorithm handles image features. On the one hand, we
have the traditional face anti-spoofing methods, which use
hand-crafted features and employ shallow machine learn-
ing, and on the other hand the deep learning methods.
Regarding the more traditional approaches to anti-
spoofing, [13] studied several hand-crafted feature / shallow
classifier combinations. The features they studied included
Differences of Gaussians, and features obtained through
Logarithmic Total Variation smoothing, while their clas-
sifiers included Sparse Logistic Regression, Sparse Low
Rank Bilinear Logistic Regression, and SVMs. In sub-
sequent work, Local Binary Patterns (LBPs) are the most
commonly used image features. In [6], LBPs are used
against various presentation attacks, such as printed pho-
tographs, digital photos and videos.
The above shallow methods do not always generalise
well to previously unseen attacks. Deep learning is an al-
ternative approach, which regularly outperforms more tra-
ditional approaches, since, in the context of such complex
tasks, multi-layered methods seem better suited for the ex-
traction of the high-level features of a dataset [15].
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) in particular
have achieved impressive results on a range of image and
video classification tasks. One of the earliest attempts on
liveness detection with CNNs is Yang et al. [20], the re-
sults of which were improved by Atoum et al. [3] using a
two-stream CNN-based face anti-spoofing method; the first
stream extracts local and holistic features and the second is
used to estimate a dense depth map. Their proposed model
performed well under intra-dataset testing mode. Xu et al.
[18] proposed a method to extract a video’s temporal el-
ements using a deep neural network architecture combin-
ing LSTM units with a CNN containing two convolutions
layers followed by max-pooling. Their model performed
well under the intra-dataset testing mode, however, under
a cross-database testing mode, these CNN models exhibit
poor generalisability due to the overfitting of the training
data.
2.1. Anomaly detection in face anti-spoofing
In [17], an anomaly detection classifier is proposed,
which uses an autoencoder for feature extraction followed
by a one-class SVM for classification, and their aim is gen-
eralization on previously unseen attacks, rather than previ-
ously unseen databases. In contrast, here we use a more
complex convolutional autoencoder and do not rely on an
SVM for classification. In [19] they use a sparse autoen-
coder to encode high level features. In [10], they use a
convolutional autoencoder, like us, for feature extraction
and MLPs for classification, however, their input data are
much more complex consisting of Depth and NIR infor-
mation together with the RGB. In [9], an anomaly detec-
tion approach based on the use of a deep metric was pro-
posed, while in [1], subject-specific information was used
with one-class classifiers to improve considerably the sys-
tem’s performance. In [2], they use hand-crafted features
such as LBPs and image quality metrics and then show
that one-class classifiers work better than binary ones on
cross-database testing mode. Finally, in [11], assuming that
clients images have similar texture types, a Gaussian Mix-
ture Model is used to represent textures, and again one-class
classifiers are shown to outperform the binary ones.
2.2. Databases
Replay-Attack[6] is one of the most popular anti-
spoofing databases and we used it to create our baseline.
The NUAA Photograph Imposter Dataset [13], which we
used for cross-database testing is also a very popular pub-
licly available dataset. The NUAA were collected from 15
subjects using cheap webcams in three sessions on different
environments and illumination conditions. Several attacks
were simulated, the ones we test against here are based on a
printed photo using A4 paper and a color printer. Notice that
NUAA is consider a particularly challenging case when one
is testing cross-database generalization [19], and the use of
webcams, in particular, makes it significantly different than
Replay-Attack, CASIA-FASD [22], or MSU-MFSD [15].
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3. The experimental setup
We employ a standard anomaly detection technique,
based on a convolutional autoencoder, Hinton et al. Au-
toencoders are neural networks consisting of two parts. The
encoder part of the network processes the input image and
produces the code, a compressed representation of the input
of, usually, a much lower dimension. The decoder recon-
structs the original image from the code[16].
The entire autoencoder is trained with images from the
single class of the one-class classification problem [4]. The
cost function is the reconstruction error, in our case, the
Euclidean distance between the original and the encoded
and then decoded reconstructed image. As the network is
trained to minimise the reconstruction error of images in
that class, a high reconstruction error value indicates images
outside the class and thus, we compare the reconstruction
error with a threshold to decide whether the image belongs
to the class.
3.1. The proposed autoencoder
Figure 1 shows the architecture of the proposed autoen-
coder [10]. The input is a 64 × 64 RGB image; the en-
coder consists of three convolutions layers while the de-
coder, which is symmetric to the encoder and consists of
three up-sampling layers, reconstructs a representation of
original input image. We used nonlinear activation func-
tions (RELU).
All code was written in Python, on the Keras deep learn-
ing platform, and the experiments ran on an Intel Core i7
CPU64 GB RAM PC. The CAE network was trained with
the RMSprop optimizer for 50 epochs, with a learning rate
of 0.001. The batch the size was set to 32.
3.2. Training, validation, and test datasets
Faces on the images of all test and training datasets were
detected with the Haar feature-based cascade classifier that
was proposed by Viola and Jones in [14], followed by man-
ual inspection and selection. User input was required, es-
pecially in the creation of training images from the in-the-
wild, due to performance issues of the face detector on such
images; image quality issues such as out of focus blurry
faces; and in some cases the need to exclude imposter im-
ages, e.g. faces on a poster on a wall. All selected faces
were cropped and normalized to 64× 64 pixels.
We tested the autoencoder on two test datasets, the first
from the Replay-Attack database and the other from the
NUAA, consisting of 236 images each. The imposter part of
the test datasets contained images from all types of attacks
supported by these two databases.
As the architecture and the training protocol of the au-
toencoder are fixed, the main variable of our experiment is
the training set. As our aim is to see how the choice of
Description size
D1 Replay-Attack 1027
D2 Replay-Attack +Wild images 1190
D3 Combine Replay-Attack with others DB 1459
Table 1. Description and size of the training datasets.
training set affects the generalisation power of the classifier
across the two test databases, we opted for training datasets
such that D1 is subset of D2 and D3, and D2 subset of D3:
D1 Images form the Replay-Attack data set only. We used
10 client subjects videos, both controlled and adverse.
D2 We added 163 face images harvested online using gen-
eral keywords such as teachers. These 163 face im-
ages were manually chosen from a larger collection,
the main considerations being to be frontal face im-
ages, in-focus, and of a good size so the normalisation
to size 64× 64 does not require excessive zooming.
D3 We added 269 images from the SCface and the
CASIA-WebFace databases. The SCface is a surveil-
lance camera face database from which we used the
mugshot, still color images, captured indoors un-
der controlled illumination conditions. The CASIA-
WebFace is a very large dataset, consisting of 10,575
subjects, collected in a semi-automatic way from the
Internet. We used a random subset of it.
The description of the training datasets is summarized in
Table 1.
The validation dataset was kept constant to simplify the
design of the experiment. It consisted of 208 images from
the Replay-Attack, CASIA-Webface and in-the-wild im-
ages. As the use of a validation set with a composition
similar to the training dataset D3 may lead to an underes-
timate of the performance of the performance of proposed
autoencoder on Replay-Attack under intra-database proto-
col, we also report HTER values computed under the use of
a validation set consisting of Replay-Attack images only.
4. Results and discussion
Figure 2 shows the ROC curves of the proposed autoen-
coder, trained on the three datasets, and tested on Replay-
Attack (top) and NUAA (bottom). The corresponding Areas
Under the Curve are reported on Table 2. We notice that the
inclusion of the in-the-wild images in the training dataset
improved markedly the cross-database generalisation power
of the classifier with the value of the AUC on the NUAA go-
ing up from 0.19 to 0.56. Moreover, the inclusion of images
from non-specialized databases further increased the AUC
to 0.61. We also notice a moderate fall on the performance
on Replay-Attack, with the AUC going down from .97 to
3
Figure 1. The architecture of the proposed convolutional autoencoder.
.95 and then to .85. We also note the high performance of
the algorithm under an intra-database test mode, that is, the
high AUC value of .97 AUC on the Replay-Attack.
D1 D2 D3
Replay-Attack .97 .95 .85
NUAA .19 .56 .61
Table 2. The AUC values corresponding to the ROC curves shown
in Figure 2.
The value of the AUC is an integral over all possible op-
erating points, that is, overall possible thresholds against
which we compare the reconstruction error and determine
whether a sample should be classified as client or imposter.
Thus, it separates the problem of assessing the discrimina-
tive power of the classifier from the problem of finding an
optimal, for the given test, operating point. Next, we will
assess the proposed method on its capability to determine
an optimal operating point.
In the literature, classifier performance on a specific op-
erating point is usually assessed either by reporting sepa-
rately the False Positive Rate (FPR) and the False Negative
Rate (FNR), or their mean average Half Total Error Rate.
We note that reporting an operating specific performance
metric does not necessarily mean that the problem of find-
ing the optimal operating point has been addressed. For
example, it could be reported the minimum HTER over-
all operating points, or the True Positive Rate correspond-
ing to certain fixed values of FPR. Employing a commonly
used technique to address this problem, we first compute
a threshold on the validation set, here the threshold corre-
sponding to the Equal Error Rate (EER) on that set, and use
this threshold to compute the HTER.
Table 3 summarizes the HTERs of our method and the
corresponding HTERs reported in [5]. The high HTER val-
ues on NUAA, as opposed to the more satisfactory discrim-
inating power of the classifier shown in the ROC curves, in-
dicate that the threshold computed on the validation set can-
not be used on NUAA. We note that [5] also reports a very
high HTER, which again indicates that a satisfactory oper-
ating point on NUAA could not be found. Finally, we note
that our convolutional autoencoder performs worse than [5]
on Replay-Attack on intra-database test mode. However,
we also note that our HTER value of .19 on Replay-Attack
goes down to .15 when the non-Replay-Attack images are
removed from the validation set. Moreover, the HTERs
vales of 0.05 and 0.51 that we report in Table 3 for brevity,
correspond to the lowest rates achieved by four different
classifiers, which in [5] are reported to range from 0.05 to
0.32 for Replay-Attack and from .51 to .65 for NUAA.
D1 D2 D3 [5]
Replay-Attack .19 .16 .21 .05
NUAA .50 .50 .50 .51
Table 3. HTERs computed on the operating point corresponding to
the EER on the validation set. The last column shows the HTERs
reported in [5].
5. Conclusions
Our experiments show that one-class classifiers trained
with images in-the-wild are a promising research direction
towards the development of face anti-spoofing algorithms
that would be able to operate in uncontrolled environments
and detect previously unseen types of attacks. In particular,
we showed that the inclusion of such images in the train-
ing set of a convolutional autoencoder, which was originally
trained on the Replay-Attack database, increased markedly
its performance on the unseen NUAA database, as shown
by the ROC curves and the corresponding AUC values.
On the other hand, we also note that the algorithm could
not operate successfully on both Replay-Attack and NUAA
on a single operating point. Thus, the question of identify-
ing suitable operating points for the algorithm to be able to
work successfully on cross-database mode is still open.
In the future, we plan to test the effect of the augmenta-
tion of the training set with in-the-wild images on various
other anomaly detection algorithms, and also test the use of
larger sets of in-the-wild images. The main challenge in the
construction of very large training sets of in-the-wild im-
ages is that the typical online searches return many images
that have undergone significant, and unknown to us, pro-
cessing. We believe that the use of automatic image quality
assessment algorithms, such as [7], can facilitate such an
image selection task.
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Figure 2. ROC curves corresponding to classifier/training dataset combinations, tested on Replay-Attack (top) and NUAA (bottom).
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